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Abstract 
In this paper we use several well-being measures that combine average income with a 
measure of inequality to undertake international and intertemporal well-being comparisons in 
transition countries.  Our well-being measures drastically change the impression of levels and 
changes in well-being from a traditional reliance on income measures.  They also significantly 
affect the ranking of countries, when compared to rankings based on real incomes.  Due to low 
inequality and moderate income levels, socialist countries enjoyed relatively high levels of 
economic well-being. In the transition process, rising inequality and falling incomes have led to a 
dramatic decline in well-being in many transition countries, and a corresponding worsening in 
rank when compared to other countries.  There is great variance in the income and inequality 
performance of transition countries.  We find a close correlation between income losses and 
inequality increases suggesting the ability of appropriate policies to reduce the income losses and 
reduce rising inequality.  While the political dimension of transformation remains largely 
successful, our indicators suggest that most transition countries have yet to reach the level of 
economic well-being enjoyed in the late 1980s. 
 
1. Introduction 
It is well-known that many transition countries1 suffered from severe contractions in 
income levels.  While in some countries, the economies have stabilized and returned to positive 
income growth, in others the contraction has continued to this day.  By 1998, only six countries 
have managed to surpass their per capita income level they had in 1988 (see Figure 1); many are 
still between 20-50% below that level. In fact, Milanovic (1998) demonstrates that the income 
losses suffered by many transition countries are higher and more persistent than they were during 
the Great Depression in the Western capitalist world. 
 At the same time, income inequality has increased in most transition economies, a subject 
that has also received considerable attention in the literature (e.g. Milanovic, 1998; Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1992; Flemming and Micklewright, 2000; Klasen, 1994a).  The welfare economic 
implications of these two developments, declining incomes and rising inequality, has been studied 
much less.  A broad range of philosophical approaches to the measurement of welfare (ranging 
from utilitarianism with some very reasonable assumptions about utility functions to Rawlsian 
reasoning or Sen’s capability approach) would suggest that, ceteris paribus, rising income 
inequality reduces aggregate well-being.  In fact, there exist a range of measures for well-being 
that make use of this insight and combine mean income with some measure of income inequality 
to arrive at better measures of welfare than average income alone (e.g. Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1973; 
Dagum, 1990; Ahluwalia and Chenery, 1974).  Using insights from this literature, this paper 
applies indicators of income and income distribution to transition countries to arrive at a more 
accurate summary assessment of well-being, and changes in well-being, than either of these 
measures alone would allow.   
We find that the measures that include income inequality in the assessment of well-being 
have a significant influence on absolute levels of well-being, comparisons of well-being among 
transition countries, and between transition countries and comparable middle-income countries.  
Prior to the transition, moderate income levels and low inequality translated into fairly high levels 
of well-being as measured by our indicators.  The nature of income inequality in socialist 
countries also differed to other countries and was characterized by particularly high income shares 
of the poorest quintile.  After the transition, reduced income levels and much higher inequality has 
                                                 
1 We will focus our attention on the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  Countries 
such as China, Vietnam, and Laos are not considered here.   
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led to a dramatic worsening in ranking of most transition countries.  This decline in ranking is 
much more pronounced for most successor states of the Soviet Union than for Central and Eastern 
European countries.  Moreover, deteriorations in well-being are understated using income 
measures alone.  Once worsening inequality is considered, the well-being losses in transition 
countries are magnified.  In that context, we note that there appears to be a positive correlation 
between the level of income loss and the deterioration of inequality.  Thus our indicators generally 
accentuate difference between the poor economic performers who often had sharply rising 
inequality and the better economic performers who tended to have more moderate increases in 
inequality.  Finally, there appears to be fairly close agreement between our measure of well-being 
and other indicators of human development that go beyond the focus on income (see also Klasen, 
1994a).  In contrast, indicators of political and civil liberties have improved dramatically and are 
thus at variance with the changes in economic well-being indicators in transition countries. 
It should be pointed out at the start that this paper presents tentative results on a matter that 
is far from settled.  On the theoretical side, we do not wish to propose definitive measures of well-
being.  Clearly, our measures that merely combine income and its distribution are fairly limited 
and cannot pretend to fully capture all aspects of well-being, not even all economically relevant 
aspects of well-being.2 Instead, we merely wish to illustrate how reasonable ways of incorporating 
inequality in an assessment of well-being will change our impression of well-being across space 
and time.  On the empirical front, our conclusions should be seen as equally tentative.  We have to 
rely on imperfect data on both income levels and income distribution.  For transition countries, a 
number of additional problems of data reliability as well as interpretation arise.  In particular, 
there are question as to the reliability and appropriate interpretation of comparisons of income 
inequality in socialist and capitalist countries.  Moreover, it is not clear that pre- and post-
transition data on income inequality (or income, for that matter) can easily be compared (see 
Flemming and Micklewright, 2000, Milanovic, 1998).  Some of these issues will be discussed 
below, but clearly these are difficult question that are far from resolved.   
The paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the theoretical issues 
involved in comparing well-being across space and time.  Section 3 discusses the measures of 
well-being we use in this paper.  Section 4 presents the data and our manipulations for this 
analysis.  Section 5 contains the results for the international analysis, section 6 describes the 
sensitivity analysis, section 7 illustrates comparisons across time, and section 8 concludes. 
 
2. The Theory of Well-Being and Real-Income Comparisons    
Despite a long history, the theory of well-being comparisons across space and time 
continues to be beset with conceptual and practical problems.  Ever since it became evident that 
social choice theory was not yielding acceptable3 procedures for making comparative or 
intertemporal social welfare judgements, social welfare judgements have been based on axiomatic 
approaches to welfare measurement.  Those are based on a conceptualization of what constitutes 
welfare and the subsequent derivation of an indicator that, under certain stated assumptions, can 
adequately measure the chosen concept. 
Applying such measures to comparisons across space and time generate additional 
problems (Sen 1982, 1984).  In particular, the theory of welfare comparisons is based on 
simultaneous situational comparisons undertaken by the same people, while intertemporal 
                                                 
2 See Osberg and Sharpe (2000) for a more ambitious approach to the measurement of economic well-being in OECD 
countries.   
3 Acceptable is meant in the sense of obeying minimal requirements such as the four conditions stated by Arrow in his 
famous impossibility result (Arrow, 1963).  See also Sen (1973, 1999) for a discussion.  
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comparisons ass the well-being of the same people at different points in time, and international 
comparisons assess the well-being of different persons.4   In addition to this theoretical problem, 
the comparability of prices throws up an additional problem, namely of the appropriate exchange 
rate for international comparisons.  Until recently, most real income comparisons were based on 
official exchange rates despite the knowledge that they are often distorted as a result of 
speculation and currency restrictions, and that they imply a systematic underevaluation of the non-
traded sector in poorer countries.  In recent years, the ICP Project has generated purchasing power 
parity estimates of GDP and GNP based on international prices that try to address these particular 
short-comings.5  Purchasing Power Parity approaches should also lead to improved estimates of 
GNP and GDP in pre-transition economies where the domestic prices were substantially different 
from prices in market economies (Summers and Heston, 1991).6   
The most commonly used indicator for welfare comparisons across space and time is real 
per capita income.7  It can be derived from utilitarian welfare economics using three alternative 
sets of assumptions.  One set would demand everyone to have identical unchanging cardinal 
utility functions where income (or consumption)8 enters the utility function linearly (e.g. in the 
simplest form, every unit of consumption generates one unit of utility).  An alternative set of 
assumptions could allow for more realistic concave utility functions, but would still require 
identical utility functions and require in addition that everyone is earning the per capita income 
and thus consumes the mean commodity bundle (Sen, 1984).  A third set is based on Samuelson 
(1947) and takes an ‘individualistic approach’ to welfare measurement.  Under this approach, we 
recover social welfare from individual welfare based on revealed preferences using the Pareto 
principle.  If preferences are complete, convex, and monotonically increasing, if each person’s 
welfare only depends on their purchases (i.e. no externalities and public goods), if there are no 
market imperfections on the buyer’s side, and if each person is rational in the sense that her 
choices reflect her welfare ranking, then the ratio of market prices should equal the ratio of intra-
personal weights (marginal rates of substitution) attached to these goods.  These assumptions are 
not sufficient, however, to ensure that the market prices say anything about the valuation of a 
good going to two different people, as this requires interpersonal comparisons.  To be able to 
make such interpersonal comparisons which is required for all real income comparisons, we need 
to assume in addition that the income distribution is ‘optimal’ to ‘keep the ethical worth of each 
person’s marginal dollar equal’ (Samuelson, 1947:21).   
                                                 
4 A situational comparisons asks whether a person would hypothetically prefer situation A to B.  This comparison thus 
takes place at the same time and is done by the same person.  Intertemporal or international welfare comparisons, 
however, address different questions.  Intertemporal comparisons have to contend with the problem that the persons 
are not evaluating the welfare of two situations simultaneously, but sequentially.  This may generate problems if 
overall perceptions of welfare or tastes have changed over time (in addition to the problem that not all the people are 
alive in both periods).  Comparisons across space, as done in inter-country comparisons, are even more difficult as 
now the persons differ whose welfare is being compared and we know little about differences in their preferences. In 
addition, the comparison could be made using the price (or other welfare weight) vectors of either country, which 
would not necessarily generate the same result.  For details, see Sen (1982, 1984). 
5 While these data generated by these methods are widely used, they are not beyond question.  In particular, the 
resulting adjusted per capita incomes are sensitive to the choice of ‘international prices’ which is closer to the prices 
prevailing in rich countries (Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrison, 1991).  Moreover, PPP adjustments can differ in their 
outcomes as differences between the World Bank estimates and the Penn World Tables demonstrate (see below).   
6 At the same time, such comparisons will still have to face the problem of different product quality between socialist 
and capitalist economies, which might lead to an overstatement of incomes in socialist countries.  For a discussion see 
(Summers and Heston, 1991).   
7 There are well-known omissions of GNP as a measure of value created in the economy.  These issues will not be 
discussed further here. 
8 We abstract from the difficulties associated with the treatment of saving in an indicator of welfare.  See for example, 
the paper by Osberg and Sharpe (2000).   
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All three sets of assumptions are beset with problems.  While many aspects of the various 
sets of assumptions appear unrealistic, the need to explicitly ignore the distribution of income in a 
welfare comparison appears particularly unpalatable in all three sets of assumptions.   Ignoring 
income distribution through the assumption of linear utility functions, through the assumption of 
everyone having the same income, or through the assumption of income distribution being 
‘optimal’ from a welfare point of view is all equally problematic.  In fact, both theoretical 
considerations (e.g. declining marginal utility of income derived from convex preferences) as well 
as empirical observations (e.g. about risk aversion and insurance) clearly suggest that the existing 
distribution of incomes is not ‘optimal’ from a social welfare point of view, or that utility 
functions are linear in income or consumption.  Instead, these theoretical and empirical 
considerations point to concave utility functions, i.e. that inequality reduces aggregate welfare as 
the marginal utility of income among the poor is much higher than among the rich.9 
Non-utilitarian views of welfare would also suggest that income inequality reduces 
aggregate well-being.  For example, Sen’s capabilitity approach (Sen, 1987) which calls for a 
maximization of people’s capability to function (e.g. the capability to be healthy, well-nourished, 
adequately housed, etc.) also exhibits declining marginal returns in the income space.10   
Similarly, application of Rawlsian principles would also suggest that welfare is higher in societies 
where inequality is lower (Rawls, 1971).11   
One approach to improve upon the welfare content of real income comparisons is therefore 
to jettison this neglect of income distribution and incorporate the notion of declining marginal 
welfare returns of income.  Each of the measures proposed in the next section does precisely this 
in slightly different ways.    
Before turning to this issue, however, it may be useful to consider one explicit objection to 
the incorporation of distributional issues in an assessment of well-being.  In particular, it may be 
argued that redistributions reduce the long-term growth potential of an economy so that there may 
be a trade-off between higher well-being associated with lower inequality today and lower well-
being associated with the subsequently reduced economic growth.  While such dynamic 
considerations go beyond the scope of this analysis and would, in any case, require the inclusion 
of other dynamic issues (e.g. the role of savings and of depreciation of human, natural, and 
physical capital in long-term well-being of nations)12, there is a growing consensus that this trade-
off between distribution and growth does not, in fact, exist.  In fact, if anything, the debate has 
recently shifted in the opposite direction suggesting that initial inequality lowers subsequent 
growth prospects rather than increases them (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1997; Alesina and 
Rodrick, 1994;  Clarke, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Klasen, 1999).  While these findings 
are still tentative and subject to some debate13, they suggest that the older claim, that high 
                                                 
9 This is inherent also in the approach by  Graaf (1957) and Sen (1982) who treat the same good going to two 
different people as two different goods and thus explicitly do away with the distinction between size and distribution 
of income as the 'welfare depends on them both'. (Sen, 1982).   
10 For example, there appears to be a concave relationship between income and life expectancy, and income and 
educational achievement.  For a discussion, see Klasen (1994b).   
11 In the lexicographic version of the maximin principle, only the position of the worst off is relevant; if one 
generalizes a bit, one would get a more continuous declining marginal valuation of income.  Similarly, Hirsch’s views 
on the social limits to growth also imply declining aggregate well-being as a result of inequality.  For details see 
Hirsch (1977) and Klasen (1994b).   
12 One might also want to consider longevity in conjunction with income and income inequality to measure for how 
long people are able to enjoy the incomes they enjoy.  For a discussion, see Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrison, 
(1991). 
13 See, for example, Lundberg and Squire (1999) who regard growth and income inequality as jointly determined 
rather than one causing the other; they also find that inequality is particularly bad for income growth among the poor, 
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inequality is essential for high subsequent economic growth, does not seem to be borne out by the 
weight of the evidence (see also Klasen, 1994b).   
 
3. The Well-Being Measures Used 
In this section we describe some measures that jointly consider per capita income and its 
distribution and therefore avoid the particularly problematic neglect of income distribution in a 
consideration of welfare.  Most are well-known in the inequality literature although not all of 
them have been used explicitly for aggregate welfare comparisons.   All share the feature that they 
can be summarized by the following formula: 
( )IW −= 1µ   where: 10 ≤≤ I  
Welfare is a function of mean income µ, reduced by a measure of inequality I.  Thus 
inequality adjusts mean income downward to reflect the welfare loss associated with the (unequal) 
distribution of that mean income.  We will consider several measures because the different 
measures not only differ in the intensity of the ‘welfare penalty’ they impose but also (implicitly) 
in the penalty they impose for different types of inequality.        
The first measure considered is proposed by Sen (1982) and incorporates inequality 
through the Gini coefficient.  This Sen measure can be stated as:  
( )GS −= 1µ  where µ is the mean income and G is the Gini coefficient.   
The Sen measure can be derived by replacing Samuelson’s problematic ‘optimal 
distribution’ assumption by the assumption of ‘rank order weighting’ (Sen, 1973).  Individual 
incomes will be weighted according to their rank in the income distribution (with the richest 
receiving rank 1 and thus the lowest weight for their income).  It can also be derived from a utility 
function where individuals consider not only their own incomes, but the entire income 
distribution, with particular emphasis on the number of people with incomes below or above 
one’s own (Dagum, 1990).  Thus preferences are assumed to be interdependent which accords 
well with recent empirical findings (e.g. Easterlin, 1995; Banerjee, 1997). 
A variant of this measure was proposed by Dagum (1990): 
( ) )
1
21(
1
1
G
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+
−=
+
−
= µµ .  
Clearly, the Dagum measure is a more extreme version of the Sen measure as it imposes a 
higher penalty for inequality as the denominator imposes an additional penalty for inequality.  The 
Dagum measure can also be based on interdependent preferences and additionally implies that 
people receive a further welfare penalty from the people ahead of them in their income 
distribution which also appears to be a reasonable assumption.14 
In addition, we consider two versions of the Atkinson welfare measure.  The Atkinson 
measure was developed as an indicator of inequality that explicitly considers the welfare loss 
associated with inequality in the measure (Atkinson, 1970).  But one can equally well just use the 
way the welfare loss is calculated, the equally distributed equivalent income (EDEA), as the 
welfare measure itself.15  This equally distributed equivalent income is the amount of income that, 
                                                                                                                                                               
while it has a different effect for income growth among the rich.  See also Forbes (2000) who finds evidence that the 
trade-off does indeed exist.  
14 See Dagum (1990) for a derivation and justification of this measure.   
15 This has been done, for example, by UNDP in deriving the gender-related development index (UNDP, 1995).  For 
a discussion, see Bardhan and Klasen (1999). 
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if distributed equally, would yield the same welfare as the actual mean income and its present 
(unequal) distribution (Deaton, 1997).  The general form of this measure is16: 
ε
ε
−
=
− 


== ∑ 1
1
1
1122
N
i
ixN
EDEAA  
This measure depends crucially on the exponent ε, the aversion to inequality factor.  The 
higher ε, the higher penalty for inequality.  We consider two cases, ε=2 (Α2), and ε=1 (Α1).  In the 
latter case, the general form of the Atkinson measure is not defined and for this case the measure 
changes to: 
∑
=
==
N
i
ixN
EDEAA
1
)ln(1)1ln()1ln(  
The Atkinson measures can be derived from social welfare functions that are additively 
separable functions of individual incomes.  Thus they are based on individualistic utility functions 
where people only care about their own incomes.  Inequality reduces welfare in this formulation 
as the utility functions considered are concave for all ε greater than 0.  All the measures exhibit 
constant relative risk aversion.  The ε=1  has the additional property of being based on a constant 
elasticity utility function, suggesting that a percentage increase in income is valued the same 
regardless of its recipient.  Such an assumption has quite a lot of intuitive appeal (see below). 
While clearly ε=2 penalizes inequality more than ε=1 and is thus based on declining elasticity of 
income, the underlying assumption, that at twice the level of income, a percentage increase in 
income is valued half as much as at the lower level of income which also appears to be within the 
range of reasonable assumptions (see Deaton, 1997 and UNDP, 1995). Such penalties of 
inequality are still consistent with findings from the micro literature on utility and risk.  Most of 
the non-utilitarian theories suggested above would, in fact, likely require considerably higher 
inequality aversion.17 While the Atkinson measures are typically based on individual incomes, our 
N refers to the five income quintiles, the only information we have available for the analysis.18  
Before turning to the data and the results, it is important to briefly discuss the most 
important differences between the measures.19  Apart from the penalty applied to inequality, the 
two Gini-based measures differ quite fundamentally from the two Atkinson measures (and thus 
the Ahluwalia and Chenery measures) in ways that are important to consider.  First, the two sets 
of measures respond differently to equal-sized income transfers at different points in the income 
                                                 
16 Also, this measure satisfies the general form of the well-being measure W=µ(1-I) where I= 1-A/µ.  See Atkinson 
(1970). 
17 A strict interpretation of Rawls lexicographic maximin principle would require ε to be infinite (see also Atkinson, 
1970). 
18 A third set of measures were proposed by  Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974). They proposed a measure which they 
called a population-weighted or equal-weighted growth rate which is simply the arithmetic average of the growth rates 
of each individual (or quintile).  Instead of treating a dollar increase the same regardless of its recipient, this measure 
treats a percentage increase the same, thus also allowing for declining marginal utility of income and exhibiting what 
Ahluwalia and Chenery called the ‘one person, one vote’ principle of growth measurement.  It turns out that this 
measure is a small-number approximation of the Atkinson ε=1 measure.  The similarity between this measure and the 
Atkinson measure gives another quite nice justification for the Atkinson measure.  Similarly, their second well-being 
measure, the welfare or poverty-weighted growth rate (which gives greater weight to income increases of the poor 
than the rich) is a discrete approximation of a version of the Atkinson with ε>1.  Our A2 measure will therefore yield 
very similar results.  For details, see Klasen (1994b) and Grün and Klasen (2000). 
19 For a more extensive discussion of these issues, refer to Atkinson (1970), Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) and 
Dagum (1990). 
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distribution.  While all measures are consistent with the Dalton principle of transfers20, the 
Atkinson measures obey what has been called ‘transfer sensitivity’, which means that an equal 
sized transfer will have a larger impact on inequality (and thus on welfare) if it happens among the 
poorer sections of the income distribution than if it happens among richer sections (Sen, 1997).  
Most would agree that this is a desirable property.   
In contrast, the largest impact of an equal sized transfer using the Gini coefficient will be 
among the mode of the income distribution, i.e. among middle income groups as these transfers 
will have the largest impact on the rank of the people affected by the transfer and thus the weights 
attached to their incomes (see Atkinson, 1970; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1978).  While there is 
some justification for this (if income comparisons with others are very important, clearly shifts in 
income which have a large impact on the ranking should be weighed heavily), most analysts see 
this as a rather undesirably property of the Gini-based measures.21   
Second, the Atkinson measures are sub-group consistent and thus imply that any increase 
in the income of a subgroup (or a reduction in inequality of that subgroup) will, ceteris paribus, 
raise aggregate welfare.  In contrast, an increase of income accruing to the richest could actually 
lower aggregate welfare in the Gini-based measures as the increase in mean income can be more 
than off-set by the increase in inequality.22  Some see this as an argument in favor of the Gini-
based measures (e.g. Sen, 1997, Dagum, 1990), others see subgroup consistency as a valuable 
property.  For our purposes it will suffice to note that the Gini-based measures penalize inequality 
more if middle income groups are hurt the most, while the Atkinson measure will penalize more if 
the poorest are hurt the most by it.  Which measure presents a better approximation of the impact 
of income and its distribution on well-being is left for the reader to decide.   
We will use these measures in three different ways.  First, we will simply see how much 
the incorporation of inequality reduces our impression of aggregate well-being.  We will therefore 
present data on how much well-being is reduced in a country at a point in time by the amount of 
inequality that is present.  This can be achieved by simply presenting the ratio of inequality-
adjusted per capita income (as calculated using our four measures) to the unadjusted per capita 
income.  Second, we will examine to what extent the incorporation of inequality changes the 
ranking of countries.  Here, we will compare transition countries with a set of comparable 
countries from Europe and the developing world.23  Third, we will study to what extent the 
inclusion of inequality in the well-being measure will affect our impression of changes in well-
being in selected transition countries.  
 
                                                 
20 The Dalton principle of transfers states that an inequality measure must be reduced by a transfer from a richer 
person to a poorer person without changing their position in the income ranking. 
21 For a discussion, see Sen (1997). 
22 See Dagum (1990) for examples.  This difference only appears if inequality is much more extreme than the types of 
inequality existing in today’s world. 
23 These countries include Spain and Portugal, the countries in Western Europe that were quite similar in income 
levels prior to the transition, as well as most middle-income developing countries, which now have similar income 
levels to transition economies.  We also include China since it is also a transition economy, and since it has similar 
income levels to some of the poorer former Soviet Republics. 
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4. The Data    
For most of the analysis, we rely on three different cross-country data sets. We use per 
capita Gross National Product as the basis of our income comparison.24  Those income data are 
PPP adjusted per capita incomes primarily based on the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators, (World Bank, 1999).  For 1980, we will also compare them to income data from the 
Penn World Table, mark 5.6 (NBER, 2000).  As we focus on the transition period, we will 
concentrate on the period from 1980 to 1995.25 
Information about income distribution is not as readily available.  For data on transition 
countries for the years 1988 and 1995, we rely on the data set produced by Milanovic (1998).  
While this data set is clearly not beyond reproach (see below), it is custom-made for the analysis 
of inequality trends in transition countries and is therefore likely to be the most consistent 
available source.  It provides detailed information on Gini coefficients and decile shares of 
income.  In addition, it is one of the few data sets that specifically address the problem of the 
many boundary changes in the transition process and report on data of the newly created entities 
prior to the transition.  Most secondary sources on inequality, including Deininger and Squire 
(1996, 1998) and Wider’s World Income Inequality Database (Wider, 1999) rely on Milanovic as 
their main primary data source for transition countries.   
There are a range of questions associated with the reliability, consistency, and 
compatibility of the pre- and post-transition datasets.  First, there is the question of the reliability 
of income distribution data in socialist (i.e. pre-transition) economies, and its compatibility with 
income distribution information in Western countries.  This issue is addressed in detail in 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and Flemming and Micklewright (2000).  They find that the 
data on inequality of household incomes in most Central and Eastern European countries was of 
no worse quality than comparable data in Western countries.  In the Soviet Union, the data were 
somewhat less reliable, particularly due to a problematic sampling frame.  Regarding the 
interpretation of compatibility of income distribution data in socialist and Western countries, there 
are questions as to whether the income distribution data in socialist countries understate true 
inequality as they ignore the effect of sizeable in-kind transfers and do not account for pervasive 
problems of rationing and possibly unequal access to goods by different groups of the population.  
Both studies find, however, that in-kind earnings were not significantly more important in 
socialist countries than elsewhere, and were not generally more unequally distributed.  The effect 
of rationing also was not invariably understating income inequality so that they conclude that 
there is no strong case to be made that income distribution data from social countries 
systematically understate true inequality, when compared with Western data (Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1992; Flemming and Micklewright, 2000; see also Milanovic, 1998).26 
Regarding post-transition data, different questions emerge.  One is the reliability of income 
information in transition countries, given that the survey instruments had to be adapted 
considerably and might not be able to adequately capture the changing composition of incomes.  
                                                 
24 GNP is preferred to GDP as an indicator of welfare of a country, as the former includes factor incomes of residents 
abroad while is excludes factor incomes by non-residents.   
25 We express all data in constant 1995 prices using the US GDP deflator. 
26 The effect of rationing and poor product quality might also have an influence on comparisons of per capita incomes 
between socialist and capitalist countries.  One might argue that the same level of per capita income generates more 
well-being in the West as one can spend this income without having to face rationing and products of poor quality.  
The size of this potential bias in hard to quantify.  In contrast, socialist countries provided a range of well-being 
relevant public goods (education, health care, etc) at low or zero costs which might off-set this bias (Klasen, 1994a; 
Sen, 1991).   
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While this may be a problem in some countries27, most observers agree that the reliability of 
income data in Eastern European transition countries has not changed for the worse, and improved 
in some countries, notably where new survey instruments were developed or the existing ones 
reformed (see Flemming and Micklewright, 2000; Milanovic, 1998).28  In most of the successor 
states of the Soviet Union, the data sources are new surveys or improved versions of the old 
budget surveys; in Moldova and the Central Asian Republics (except Kyrgyz Republic), the old 
and somewhat problematic budget surveys are used as new representative sources are not 
available (Milanovic, 1998).   
Another problem is the time period on which Gini coefficients for the post transition years 
are based on. Unfortunately, for this period annual data were only available in nine countries, and 
therefore the calculations have to rely on semiannually, quarterly, and even monthly income data 
(Milanovic, 1998). Gini coefficients based on shorter periods in time will overestimate inequality, 
because fluctuations in income cannot be smoothed out that easily over shorter time periods.  
Finally, post-transition data are mostly based on disposable income while pre-transition data were 
mostly based on gross incomes.  This should not affect compatibility greatly as personal taxes (the 
most important difference between gross and disposable incomes) were comparatively small in 
socialist countries.29   
Milanovic (1998) considers these and other problems of compatibility and concludes that 
the net result appears to be that increases in inequality between before and after the transition 
might be somewhat overestimated in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Russia, the 
Baltic Republics, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz Republic, while there is likely to be no or an 
unclear bias in Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan.30  Moreover, the general sense is that inequality data in post-transition countries are 
fairly comparable with inequality information in Western countries, esp. since now the surveys 
share very similar short-comings to those in Western countries (Flemming and Micklewright, 
2000).31  We will partly address these issues of compatibility in the sensitivity analysis where we 
compare the data we used with other available sources of inequality data.   
A final problem might emerge with our approach of using benchmark years for 
comparisons of well-being.  While in most non-transition countries inequality appears to have 
been fairly stable over time (Deininger and Squire, 1998), this is not the case in transition 
countries.  As a result of increasing inequality, it will matter which year is chosen as a benchmark 
(Flemming and Micklewright, 2000).  Fortunately, all available information on trends in 
inequality over time (see Flemming and Micklewright 2000 and also Appendix 2) suggests that 
the post-transition years included in Milanovic (usually 1993-1995) are from years where the 
biggest increases in inequality have already happened; after those years, most studies find only 
small further increases.  Moreover, to the extent that inequality has increased further after the 
                                                 
27 For example, there appears to be no representative source on household per capita income inequality in Slovakia 
after the transition and the break-up with the Czech Republic.  The budget survey used excludes households headed 
by pensioners that include economically active persons and households headed by the unemployed.   
28 At the same time, there are new problems that have appeared, compared to pre-transition countries.  One is 
increasing refusal rates, particularly among richer households, and the other is that earnings are no longer validated 
using enterprise records (Milanovic, 1998).   
29 Moreover, no adjustments are made for economies of scale or adult equivalents, but all data are presented in per 
capita magnitudes.  In pre-transition countries, this can be justified since housing, the most important source of 
economies of scale, was heavily subsidized and thus played an unimportant role in the expenditure patterns of 
households.  This heavy subsidy for housing is still present in a number of countries, though much less so than 
previously.  See Fleming and Mickleright (2000) and Atkinson and Mickleright (1992) for a discussion.   
30 For more details on the data problems, see also Appendix 1 in Milanovic (1998). 
31 This is particularly the case for the countries where the surveys have been reformed or new instruments developed.   
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benchmark years chosen, this will counter the bias (mentioned above) of an apparent overestimate 
in the increase in inequality in several transition countries.   
For comparable developing countries, we rely on the well-known Deininger and Squire 
data set (1996), which provides information about Gini coefficients and quintiles shares for more 
than 100 countries at irregular intervals.  Unfortunately, the data are not based on consistent 
definitions of the income used and the economic unit considered and have been criticized for that 
and other short-comings by Atkinson and Brandolini (1999).  In the sensitivity analysis, we will 
address this issue and use a regression-based approach to generate a more consistent data source.  
This will also allow us to address the problem of different income definitions in pre- and post-
transition countries.  
 Due to the fact, that data on income distribution did not exactly match our years chosen 
for the analysis, we had to make some adjustments. In case there is no Gini coefficient for the 
particular point in time, we used the nearest available data for our calculations.  Table 1 shows, 
how we have connected the data on per capita income and inequality.32 
The international analysis we will perform for 1980, 1988, and 1995.  The first two data 
points represent the pre-transition situation and 1995 the post-transition situation.  For the 
intertemporal analysis in transition countries, we examine mainly the period between 1988 and 
1995.   
 
5. International Analysis 
Table 2 presents the results for 1980.  The analysis is restricted to 18 countries, among 
them only three (future) transition countries, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland.  The first three 
columns report per capita incomes, using exchange rates, and two estimates of PPP, respectively. 
Comparing column one with the following two shows large differences which are due to over- 
and undervalued exchange rates. This discrepancy is larger among poorer countries, related to the 
systematic undervaluation of the non-traded sectors in poor countries (Summers and Heston, 
1991). Column two illustrates the PPP-adjusted per capita incomes provided by the Penn World 
Tables 5.6 (NBER, 2000), and column three the PPP-adjusted mean incomes published by the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 1999). The comparison suggests that the PPP 
adjustment is subject to a considerable margin of error.  While the two PPP adjustments lead to 
similar results in about a third of the countries they differ, sometimes considerably, in the other 
two-thirds.  China, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Bulgaria look a lot richer in the PPP 
adjustment from the Penn World Tables than in the adjustment done by the World Bank, while 
the reverse appears to be the case for most Latin American countries, the Philippines, and 
Portugal.  As one can see, the determination of international prices to adjust for different 
purchasing powers are sensitive to the methods used and therefore the rankings according to these 
measures differ.  
The next two columns show the Atkinson measure with ε=1 and the Sen measure, both 
exhibiting a comparatively ‘mild’ well-being penalty for inequality.  The last two are the Atkinson 
with ε=2 and the Dagum measures with a more heavy implied well-being penalty for inequality.  
Well-being, as estimated by our measures, falls drastically when considering inequality.  
Using the Sen or Atkinson ε=1 measure, well-being falls by about 6-58% and by up to 70% (in 
Brazil and Mexico) in the Dagum and Atkinson (ε=2) measure.  Existing inequality thus leads to 
fairly major reductions in measured well-being in all the countries considered.  As a result of low 
                                                 
32 In nearly all cases, we use the exact year for the income estimate under the (implicit) assumption that changes in 
income distribution between adjacent years are typically smaller than changes in mean income.  
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income inequality, the three Eastern European countries attract by far the smallest penalty for 
inequality of all countries considered.  Well-being is reduced by less than 10% in the Atkinson 
(ε=1) and ‘only’ up to 40% in the Dagum measure.  As a result, the ranking of the Eastern 
European countries improves considerably. For example, Bulgaria has rank 12 in the PPP adjusted 
income per capita measure (column three) and improves to rank 7 in the Atkinson (ε=2) and 
Dagum measures.  
In 1980, Spain has the highest rank in most measures, and nothing can prevent China from 
being at the bottom of the list for all indicators.  Nevertheless, there are also a number of 
interesting rank reversals. For example, low inequality Bulgaria and high inequality Brazil trade 
places between the income measures and the broader well-being measures.  In the three income 
measures, Brazil is up to 11 ranks ahead; while in the Atkinson (ε=2) and Dagum measure, 
Bulgaria is four and three ranks ahead, respectively.  This reversal indicates that the well-being 
effect of more than 50% higher PPP adjusted per capita income (column 3) in Brazil is more than 
off-set by the much higher inequality.  Put differently, the more equal distribution in Bulgaria in 
1980 achieves higher levels of well-being as measured by these indicators than the 50% higher per 
capita incomes in Brazil.  There are similar reversals between low inequality Hungary and high 
inequality Mexico and low inequality Poland and high inequality Costa Rica. 
Table 3 shows our rankings for 33 countries in 1988.  The list now includes more 
transition countries, among them many of the successor states (to be) of the former Soviet Union.  
This year becomes the pre-transition benchmark for assessment of the impact of transition. Again, 
there are large differences between exchange rate based estimates of real incomes and PPP 
estimates, with the discrepancy being largest among poorer countries.  Considering inequality 
continues to reduce well-being drastically.  Once again, Brazil loses most: Well-being using the 
Dagum measure is 72% below the level it would be if its per capita income were equally 
distributed!  As before, the penalties in Eastern Europe are much smaller than elsewhere due to 
their lower inequality.  As a result, Eastern Europe and the successor states of the Soviet Union all 
improve their rank when inequality is considered.  In the income measure, the worst-off eight 
include three socialist countries; in the Dagum measure, there is none.   
While Spain remains on top and China at the bottom in all measures, some more dramatic 
reversals in rank occur.  For example, Panama is seven ranks ahead of Kyrgyz Republic in the 
income measure, but is nine and twelve ranks behind Kyrgyz Republic in the Dagum and 
Atkinson (ε=2) measures, respectively.  Unequal Brazil trades places with more equal Moldova, 
and, on the upper end, Portugal gets surpassed by countries like the Czech Republic, and Slovakia 
when the well-being measures include the distribution of income as well.   
The pattern of inequality in the socialist countries also appears to be different from the 
pattern of inequality observed elsewhere.  Table 5 shows that the socialist countries, while having 
lower inequality throughout the income distribution, have particularly high levels of income 
shares accruing to the poorest quintile. They are close to, and often above, 10% while they are 
much lower in comparable countries.  In contrast, the income shares among middle-income 
groups do not differ so much.  The comparison between Spain, on the one hand, and Russia, 
Bulgaria, and Ukraine on the other is instructive.  Despite having similar Gini coefficients, the 
socialist countries have higher income shares among the poorest quintile.  At the same time, they 
also have higher income shares accruing to the richest than in Spain, while the middle income 
groups do worse.  Since, as discussed above, the Gini-based measures metes out a higher penalty 
for inequality in the middle income groups, while the Atkinson measure places the largest weight 
on income inequality among the poorest groups and the least on income inequality among richer 
groups (and thus obeys ‘transfer sensitivity’), we would expect that the socialist countries do 
relatively better with the Atkinson measures than the Gini-based measures.  This is indeed the 
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case as shown in Tables 3 and 5.  In Table 3 we see that in all socialist countries the inequality-
adjusted income using the Atkinson (ε=2) measure is much higher than in the Sen measure; in 
contrast, in all Latin American and some Asian countries the reverse is the case.  As a result, the 
socialist countries do particularly well in the ranking using the Atkinson (ε=2) measure, while the 
Latin American countries, with their puny income shares accruing to the poorest, fare particularly 
badly (see also Figure 2).   
This difference can also be seen in Table 5 where we simply subtract the inequality-
adjusted income shares (the inequality-adjusted income as a share of the unadjusted per capita 
income as reported in columns 5 and 6 in Table 3) using the Atkinson (ε=2) and the Dagum 
measure.  In socialist countries this difference is always larger than 20 percentage points 
suggesting that well-being in these countries appears a lot larger using the Atkinson measure than 
a Gini-based measure such as the Dagum measure.  This is to say that the Dagum measure 
suggests that well-being in socialist countries is reduced by more than 20 percentage points more 
due to the prevailing inequality than the Atkinson measure would imply.  In most other countries 
this difference is much smaller.  In some Latin American countries, it is negligible.  These are 
considerably differences indeed. 
Thus our impression of well-being in pre-transition socialist countries depends to a 
considerable extent on whether we believe transfer sensitivity, which attaches a higher weight to 
transfers among the poor than to equal-sized transfers among the rich, is a desirable property or 
not.  If we do, which most observers support (e.g. Atkinson, 1970; Blackorby and Donaldson, 
1978), we use the Atkinson measures and reward the socialist countries for their high income 
shares accruing to the poorest; if we do not, as supported by Dagum (1990) and Sen (1997), we 
punish them for the comparatively low income shares among middle income groups.  Thus these 
seemingly arcane and technical differences in assumptions underlying the different well-being 
measures do play a significant role in the comparative assessment of well-being in socialist 
countries.   
Table 4 examines the same 33 countries for 1995, our benchmark year for countries having 
undergone a (sometimes still incomplete) transition to a market economy. The inequality-adjusted 
measures continue to be much lower than the income measure suggesting that inequality 
continues to have a big impact on well-being. Brazil and Colombia continue to suffer from the 
largest reductions in well-being which are also now larger than previously, suggesting not only 
high but worsening inequality. 
Regarding transition economies, several important observations emerge.  First, due to 
sharply declining incomes in many transition countries, and increasing incomes elsewhere, most 
transition countries slip in the income ranking.  While six of the ten richest (in terms of PPP 
income) economies in 1988 were pre-transition socialist countries, only three remain in the top 10 
in 1995.  Conversely, instead of two there are now six transition countries among the poorest ten.  
This slippage in rank is largest for the successor states of the Soviet Union.  Russia slips ten 
ranks, Ukraine eight, Turkmenistan eight, Kazakhstan twelve ranks.  In contrast, the Central 
European countries witness the least worsening in ranks. 
Second, it is no longer invariably the case that the transition countries improve their rank 
once inequality is considered.  While this is still the case for the majority of Central, Eastern, 
South-Eastern European countries, and the Baltic Republics, it is no longer the case for many 
successor states of the former Soviet Union.  Due to sharply increased inequality, Russia now 
worsens its rank, once inequality  is considered.  The same is true for the Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic, while some of the other ex-Soviet States now merely maintain their rank once 
inequality is considered.  Thus we find that a consideration of inequality continues to improve the 
impression of relative well-being in all transition countries with the exception of several of the 
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former Soviet States.  Moreover, due to rising inequality virtually everywhere, the improvement in 
rank is now less than previously.   
Third, as a result of falling incomes and rising inequality, the rank reversals between 
transition countries and comparable countries have changed considerably.  While inequality in 
transition countries is still far below the levels of inequality in some developing countries, notably 
those from Latin America, rising inequality in transition countries ensures that the differences in 
rank are no longer as large as before.  Instead of being seven ranks ahead of the Kyrgyz Republic 
in 1988 in per capita incomes, Panama is now 23 ranks ahead.  This still gets reduced, once 
inequality is considered, but Panama remains fifteen ranks, and six ranks ahead in the Dagum and 
Atkinson (ε=2) measure (see also Figure 2).  China also manages to surpass a number of transition 
countries for the first time in 1995, indicating that the transition there appears to have been much 
more successful in increasing incomes and in stemming the rise in inequality.  Similarly, Brazil 
remains far ahead of Moldova, even if inequality is considered, and the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia are no longer able to surpass Portugal even if inequality is considered. Only Slovenia 
which has managed to surpass its pre-transition income by a considerable margin (see Figure 1) 
and has experienced a comparatively small increase in inequality, is able to surpass Portugal and 
occupy rank 2 in the Dagum and Atkinson (ε=2) measure. 
Fourth, difference in the kind of inequality between some transition countries and 
comparable countries is also now much reduced.  Table 5 shows that a considerably share of the 
increase in inequality has appeared in the form of declining income shares to the poorest quintile, 
whose income shares in several transition countries are now similar to non-transition countries.  
As a result, comparisons of Tables 4 and 5 show that the many transition countries with rising 
inequality are experiencing larger reductions when the Atkinson measure is used compared to 
when the Gini-based measures are used.  For example, in the Ukraine using the Atkinson (ε=2), 
the inequality-adjusted share is reduced from 85.5% to 51.4% between 1988 and 1995; in the 
Dagum measure, the reduction is considerably smaller, from 62.2% to 35.7%.  As a result, the 
difference between the Atkinson (ε=2) and the Dagum measure is no longer invariably much 
larger in transition countries than elsewhere.  Indeed, there are a number of countries where the 
difference is now similar to non-transition countries (see Table 3).  At the same time, the 
differences remain large in the Central European countries where there was little increase in 
inequality and the income shares of the poorest quintile remained above 10%.   
It is hard to summarize the many particular findings from this discussion.  But a few points 
are worth noting.  First, consideration of inequality has a large impact on well-being.  Well-being 
falls by 5-75% once we consider inequality.  Second, large differences in inequality between 
countries lead to very large changes in rank.  Pre-transition countries invariably improved their 
rank while many comparable developing countries experienced a corresponding fall in rank.  The 
income losses associated with the transition has led to a worsening in well-being ranking of many 
transition countries.  At the same time, worsening inequality in some countries has reduced their 
improvement in rank in the inequality-adjusted measures.  But this not true for all transition 
countries.  Figure 2 nicely summarizes these findings by making several bilateral comparisons of 
well-being rankings in 1988 and 1995.  The Ukraine-Indonesia comparison shows how 
plummeting incomes and rising inequality can worsen the comparison with a country which had 
rapidly rising incomes and stable inequality.  In 1988, Ukraine had higher income levels; 
considering inequality increased the distance to Indonesia further.  In 1995, Ukraine has a much 
lower income rank, and the difference becomes even larger when inequality is considered.33  
Similar changes occur in the comparison between Panama and Kyrgyz Republic.    
                                                 
33 The improvement in Indonesia in the inequality-adjusted measures is not due to falling inequality in Indonesia, but 
due to rising inequality in all the transition countries.   
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On the other hand, the comparisons between Poland and Brazil show that despite falling 
incomes, Poland manages to have a higher rank in the inequality-adjusted measures in 1995 since 
its inequality has risen by much less and remains far below Brazil’s.  The same holds for Romania 
and Thailand.34  Lastly, in the countries where inequality has worsened considerably, the nature of 
inequality has also changed.  In particular, the poor are hardest hit by rising inequality and the 
countries therefore experience larger declines in the Atkinson measures than in the Gini-based 
measures. 
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
In the sensitivity analysis, we consider to what extent our results are driven by 
inconsistencies in the data on income inequality and the particular data series used.  To assess to 
what extent these findings are due to peculiarities and inconsistencies in the income definition of 
the datasets used, we examine to what extent the rankings are affected by replacing the data with 
regression-based adjusted Gini coefficients35.  We present some examples of such a sensitivity 
analysis.   
First, we regress the reported Gini coefficients on the income definition (expenditure, net 
income, unknown income, or gross income, the excluded category), and the reference unit 
considered (unknown, household, or person, the excluded category).  Following suggestions from 
Atkinson and Brandolini (1999), we do not restrict the regression to the ‘accept’ series by the 
Deininger and Squire dataset but also include data labeled as cs (no consistent source) and ps 
(primary source unknown).  This enables us to get several observations per country at the same 
time, which should improve our ability to identify the reference unit and income definition 
effects.36  Regression 1 in Table 6 shows that indeed the income definition and the choice of 
reference unit do matter.  Expenditure-based and net-income or equivalized Gini coefficients are 
typically lower, while household-based Ginis appear to be higher.37  The interaction term ‘net 
income and OECD countries’ in the second regression shows that the difference between gross 
and net income is largely a phenomenon of OECD countries, as one would expect (Atkinson and 
Brandolini, 1999).  We then adjust the Gini coefficients based on the coefficients from the second 
regression and thereby base all these adjusted Ginis on disposable income per person.  This way 
we should have dealt with the most glaring inconsistencies of the data from Deininger and Squire, 
although further adjustments are surely possible (Atkinson and Brandolini, 1999).   
How do the results change if one uses these adjusted Ginis?  Table 7 shows that generally 
the results do not change greatly.  Using the Sen measure, the vast majority of rankings remains 
the same or change only by one; using the Dagum measure, there are variations that are more 
significant.  However, there is more persistence than change.  In 1995, the year when most 
changes occur due to the adjusted Ginis, only four (of 33 countries) ranks change by more than 
one position.38  Moreover, most of the dramatic rank reversals discussed earlier still hold, 
although one or two are slightly less dramatic than previously. 
                                                 
34 Romania and Poland both improve in the ranking between 1988 and 1995, no matter what indicator is used.  This is 
not due to improving well-being here, but smaller declines in well-being in these two countries compared to other 
transition countries.   
35 For the regression we do not only rely on the Gini coefficients from our sample, but include all data on income 
distribution available by the two Deininger and Squire datasets as well as from The World Income Inequality 
Database, subject to the selection  criteria described above (Wider, 1999). 
36 We include dummies for PS and CS to ensure that the mixing of these sets does not cause further distortions.   
37 The somewhat surprising result about household-based Ginis was also found by Lundberg and Squire (1999).  Note 
that the regressions here have considerably higher explanatory power (as measured by the R-squared) as the ones used 
by Dollar and Kraay (2000) and Lundberg and Squire (1999). 
38 The most significant change is a worsening of 4 ranks by Mexico. 
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Second, we also looked for data on income inequality from other sources and compared 
them to the once we have used. Appendix 2 gives an overview39.  For the pre-transition period, we 
found data in Atkinson, Micklewright (1992) and Flemming and Mickleright (2000) with a 
similar income concept used. According to these data sources, inequality has been slightly higher 
in most transition countries.  The differences to the Milanovic data are the largest for the Baltic 
States.  Nevertheless, the differences remain modest and both data sets suggest that income 
inequality in socialist countries was considerably below the levels prevailing in the countries we 
are comparing them with.   
Considering the post-transition period we can contrast the data we used with another 
expenditure-based measure also taken from Milanovic (1998) and one different data source, 
(Flemming, Micklewright, 2000) respectively. For both 'datasets', there is no such clear tendency 
as in the pre-transition period that all Gini coefficients provided are higher (or lower) compared to 
the data used in our analysis. Using expenditures per capita, there are only minor differences 
comparing the two different income concepts, except for the Kyrgyz Republic. Here the Gini 
coefficient based on expenditures is 12 percentage points below that using income data. Applying 
this lower inequality measure would somewhat improve the ranking of the Kyrgyz Republic in our 
inequality-adjusted measures.  It would not change the result of a dramatic worsening in rank, 
however. 
The few data points provided by Flemming and Micklewright (2000) are in general also 
similar to the once we have used. Only for Russia, the Gini coefficient is significantly lower, 
namely 10 percentage points (and up to 12 percentage points compared to the expenditure based 
coefficient).  But this lower Gini-coefficient is based a problematic data source, the old budget 
survey that suffered from many deficiencies.  When examining the data source most used for 
inequality assessments in post-transition Russia (the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey), 
this Gini varies from 0.43 in 1992 and 0.48 in 1996, quite similar to the figure we used (which is 
based on that survey, see Milanovic, 1998).  Moreover, despite these differences, both data 
sources point to a dramatic worsening of inequality in Russia in the early 1990s.   
This sensitivity analysis suggests that few of the basic results on the large absolute impact 
of inequality and the change in ranks as a result of it reported are meaningfully affected by using 
different data sets.40  In particular, it remains the case that the combination of falling incomes and 
rising inequality leads to a dramatic worsening of rank for most transition countries, particularly 
among the successor states of the Soviet Union.   
 
7. Comparisons Across Time 
The discussion in section 5 has already shown that in many transition countries, inequality 
has changed considerably for the worse.  In contrast, among non-transition countries, it appears 
that there is also a great deal of stability in inequality measures.41  Most countries seem to either 
improve or worsen in rank at a point in time when inequality is considered, with this relationship 
not changing much over time.  Thus for most non-transition countries, the inequality-adjusted 
measures of well-being will not differ greatly from the growth rate in per-capita incomes.   
In transition countries, however, income growth seriously biases our view of changes in 
well-being.  Per capita income losses in the first few years (from 1988 to 1995) already amount to 
                                                 
39 First, we also included data for transition countries from the Deininger and Squire datasets (1996, 1998), but they 
mostly used the data provided by Milanovic. 
40 There is, however, some support for Milanovic’s (1998) contention that inequality was slightly understated in a 
number of pre-transition countries and the subsequent increase has thus been overstated. 
41 See Deininger and Squire (1998) and Lundberg and Squire (1999). 
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between 5% in Poland to some 55% in Ukraine and Turkmenistan.  But rising inequality ensures 
that these losses are distributed very unevenly among the population.  Figure 3 shows dramatic 
differences in income growth by decile in the four countries selected.  In Russia, the poorest 
decile suffers from a 70% drop in real incomes, while the richest decile gains nearly 50%.  Similar 
differences exist in the Ukraine although here all deciles lose, but the rich much less than the 
poor.  In Poland, a country with a lower income loss, the differences in income losses among the 
declies are much smaller; in Slovakia, the data suggest a slight improvement in income inequality, 
with the poorest losing less than other groups.   
Using our measures, this rising inequality further reduces well-being, in some countries by 
considerably amounts. Figure 4 shows the combined effect of income drops and rising inequality 
on our inequality-adjusted well-being measures.  For example, the already severe income losses in 
Russia of some 43% translate, combined with the rising inequality, to well-being losses of 55-
68%, depending on the measure chosen.  In the Ukraine, the income loss of 55% combines with 
rising inequality to a well-being loss of 68-75%.  Similar dramatic differences between income 
losses and well-being losses exist in the Moldova, Estonia, Latvia and Kyrgyz Republic.  Once 
again, we see that the Central European countries, things are not nearly as bad.  Income losses are 
smaller, and the rise in inequality was more modest.  As a result, well-being losses are not so 
different from income losses in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, or Slovenia.  Slovakia is 
the only country where our impression of changes in well-being changes for the better once the 
(slightly) declining inequality is included.42 
In fact, there appears to be an interesting correlation between the per capita income losses 
and the changes in inequality.  In Figure 5 it appears that the countries with the smallest income 
losses also experienced the smallest increase in inequality; conversely, those with the largest 
income losses experienced the largest increase in the Gini coefficient.  As a result, an 
incorporation of inequality magnifies the already large differences in per capita growth rates 
between countries.  
This correlation might be related to progress in transition itself.  The EBRD’s transition 
index (EBRD, 2000) suggests that the countries where transition has been fastest, income losses 
have been least (see Table 8).  A fortiori, this would also mean that the countries where transition 
has been fastest, the rise in inequality has been the smallest.  There could be causal linkages here.  
In particular, slow transition might mean that the transition process has been captured and delayed 
by old elites who are able to slow the move towards a competitive market economy and enrich 
themselves in the process.  In contrast, the poor lose out as they depend on state resources 
(pensions, social benefits, etc) that are falling and becoming more unequal in countries where 
transition is slow and the resulting ability of the state to get a secure revenue base from taxation 
low (see Flemming and Micklewright, 2000; Milanovic, 1989).43   
But this correlation is far from perfect.  For example, in the Baltic Republics, the transition 
index suggests good progress, while income losses have been very severe and the rise in 
inequality has also been large.  Similarly, in Belarus and the Central Asian Republics show least 
progress in transition, but they do not have the largest income losses nor, on average, the fastest 
                                                 
42 While incomes have grown somewhat in some countries between 1993 and 1999, this has been insufficient to 
counteract the effect of the previously falling incomes and the increasing inequality on well-being. 
43 For example, insider privatization, little progress in restructuring and competition, combined with the inability of 
the state to raise sufficient revenue to pay for pensions and other social commitments appear to have lead to a 
combination of poor progress in transition, large income losses, and large increases in income inequality in Russia.  
As a result of these developments, the wage distribution became a lot more unequal and highly dependent on the 
sector of the economy, non-wage private income made up a sharply increasing share of total income, and social 
transfers became much more unequal.  For a discussion, see Milanovic (1998) and Flemming and Micklewright 
(2000). 
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increases in inequality.44 It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate these issue in detail.45  
The large differences in the experience of transition countries suggest, however, that large income 
losses and large increases in inequality is not the inevitable fate of transition economies.  
Apparently, there is considerable scope for economic policy to influence both developments, an 
issue that deserves further investigation.  In particular, the apparent linkage between income loss 
and inequality increases deserve close scrutiny as this have a compound effect on well-being. 
The economic misery that has accompanied the transition appears much deeper once the 
rising inequality is factored in.  In eight countries, well-being has fallen by over 40%.   Social 
indicators of well-being support this impression of a general deterioration in economic conditions 
(see also Klasen, 1994a; UNICEF, 1993; UNDP, 1996).  Compared to a rising trend elsewhere in 
the world and in comparable middle-income countries, Table 8 shows that life expectancy 
dropped for both males and females in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, while it fell only for 
males in the Baltic Republics.  But the deteriorations appear smaller than one might expect given 
the disastrous drops in our economic well-being indicators.  Also, they do not extend to all 
countries; in most Central European countries, life expectancy continued to rise, albeit at a slower 
pace than previously.   
With regard to under five mortality rates, the picture looks somewhat brighter. For 
countries with data available in 1989 as well as 1998, Latvia is the only country, in which the 
situation has worsened.  Education indicators, on the other hand, suggest a considerably 
deterioration.  Compared to a rising trend elsewhere, secondary enrolment rates have dropped in 
nearly all transition countries, in some countries by more than 20%.   
When it comes to indicators of political and civil liberties, however, the story looks very 
different.  Now most transition countries show large improvements in these indicators, which run 
counter to the income, inequality, and human development indicators.  While four transition 
countries (Belarus and several Central Asian states) remain unfree, 10 are now considered free, 
and another four partly free.   
Clearly, there is a close correlation between regress in well-being and most social 
indicators of well-being.  The fact that the latter have deteriorated somewhat less than the former 
might point to the success of efforts to protect social services in most countries, as well as to non-
linearities in the relationship between economic well-being and social measures of well-being.46  
While the economic assessment of the transformation process looks generally quite bleak (but 
                                                 
44 Milanovic (1998) classifies countries by the amount of compensation they provide to people negatively affected by 
the transition process.  He defines ‘non-compensators’ as countries where losses in the share of wage income are not 
offset by increases in social transfers, ‘compensators’ where a fair amount of ‘off-set’ has taken place, and ‘populists’ 
where all sources of population income increased as a share of GDP.  The first group includes the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine, the second group includes Belarus, Bulgaria, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, and the third group is comprised of Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.  He finds that the increase in Gini was 
largest among the non-compensators but this is entirely dependent on the inclusion of Russia and Ukraine (Milanovic, 
1998).  It appears that his classification is much more heterogeneous than the correlation between income growth and 
inequality increases presented in Figure 5. 
45 One apparent regularity appearing in the data is that there might be an inverse U-shape in the relationship between 
transition and inequality increase.  Those countries which have hardly begun to undertake a transition, such as Belarus 
and some of the Central Asian Republics, have, by maintaining the status quo, been able to reduce the increase in 
inequality; in some countries, this apparently came at the expense of large drops in income.  Those that have 
undertaken a slow and incomplete transition (e.g. Russia, Ukraine) have suffered the large income losses and the 
biggest increases in inequality, while those that have undertaken a rapid transition (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic) have managed to keep income losses and increases in inequality fairly low.  This would be interesting to 
explore further.   
46 For example, there appears to be a logarithmic relationship between per capita incomes and life expectancy which 
would suggest that at fairly high levels of per capita incomes, even a sharp reduction in income will only reduce life 
expectancy by a few years.  See Ray (1998). 
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varies greatly according to country), the indicators of political and civil rights show that the 
political dimension of the transformation was and remains, by and large, a large success in most 
transition countries (see also Sen, 1991).   
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated how inequality-adjusted indicators of well-being would 
change our impression of well-being in transition countries before and during the transition 
process.  We did this by comparing transition countries with comparable non-transition countries 
and investigated intertemporal changes in well-being in transition countries.  The main results of 
our investigation are the following. 
First, it is theoretically justified and empirically important to adjust incomes by the amount 
of inequality to arrive at more meaningful measures of well-being.  Applying these measures 
indicates that inequality can have a sizeable impact on well-being.   
Second, combined with their moderate income levels, the comparatively low inequality in 
socialist countries ensured fairly high levels of well-being.  In the transition process, well-being 
has been eroded by falling incomes and by rising inequality.  This has worsened the comparative 
position of transition countries.    
Third, low inequality in socialist countries was characterized by particularly high income 
shares of the poorest quintile.  The transition has brought disproportionate losses to this group in 
most countries so that the nature of inequality in many transition countries is now more similar to 
non-transition states.   
Fourth, there are great differences in the performance of transition countries.  In particular, 
there appears to be a close correlation between income losses and increases in inequality.  As a 
result, an inclusion of inequality accentuates the differences in well-being between the countries 
with comparatively small income losses and those with large ones.  This suggests that neither the 
large income losses nor the huge increase in inequality experienced in some countries were 
inevitable features of the transition process.  Some countries managed to transform themselves 
with minor income losses and little increase in inequality.  The reasons for this different 
performance should be investigated further, given its huge implication for well-being.    
Finally, it remains the case that the political transformation in most of the former socialist 
countries has been a great success.  Before the transformation, political and civil liberties were 
low and they have improved hugely in the last ten years.  While the political failings of the 
socialist countries were considerable and have been overcome in most states, the economic 
failings of the socialist economies were smaller than previously thought, especially if one includes 
inequality in an assessment of well-being.  It is also the case that the ten years of economic 
transformation have not been able to restore economic well-being as measured by our indicators 
to the levels they enjoyed at the end of the socialist period. 
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Table 1: The Matching of Income and Inequality Data, 1980-1995 
 
Country 1980 – Gini a 1988 – Gini 1995 – Gini 
Bulgaria 1980 (25.0) 1989 (23.3) c 1993 (34.3) c 
Belarus - 1988 (22.8) c 1995 (28.4) c 
Brazil 1980 (57.8) 1987 (56.2) 1995 (60.1) b 
China 1980 (32.0) 1988 (34.9) 1992 (37.8) 
Colombia 1978 (54.5) 1988 (51.2) 1995 (57.2) b 
Costar Rica 1981 (47.5) 1986 (42.0) 1996 (47.0) b 
Czech Republic - 1988 (19.4) c 1993 (26.6) c 
Spain 1980 (26.8) 1988 (24.4) 1990 (32.5) b 
Estonia - 1988 (23.0) c 1995 (35.4) c 
Hungary 1982 (21.0) 1987 (21.0) c 1993 (22.6) c 
Indonesia 1980 (35.6) 1987 (32.0) 1995 (34.2) b 
Jamaica 1988 (43.2) 1988 (43.2) 1993 (37.9) 
Kazakhstan - 1988 (25.7) c 1993 (32.7) c 
Kyrgyz Republic - 1988 (26.0) c 1993 (55.3) c 
Lithuania - 1988 (22.5) c 1994 (37.3) c 
Latvia - 1988 (22.5) c 1995 (31.0) c 
Moldova - 1988 (24.1) c 1993 (36.5) c 
Mexico 1984 (50.6) 1989 (55.0) 1992 (50.3) 
Malaysia 1979 (51.0) 1989 (48.4) 1995 (48.5) b 
Panama 1980 (47.5) 1989 (56.5) 1991 (56.8) b  
Peru 1981 (49.3) 1986 (42.8) 1994 (44.9) 
Philippines 1985 (46.1) 1988 (45.7) 1991 (43.8) b 
Poland 1980 (24.9) 1987 (25.6) c 1993 (28.4) c 
Portugal 1980 (36.8) 1990 (36.8) 1991 (35.6) 
Romania - 1989 (23.3) c 1994 (28.6) c 
Russia - 1988 (23.8) c 1993 (48.0) c 
Slovakia - 1988 (19.5) c 1993 (18.3) c 
Slovenia - 1987 (21.5) c 1993 (25.1) c 
Thailand 1981 (43.1) 1988 (47.4) 1992 (51.5) 
Turkmenistan - 1988 (26.4) c 1993 (35.8) c 
Ukraine - 1988 (23.3) c 1995 (47.4) c 
Uzbekistan - 1989 (28.2) c 1993 (33.3) c 
Venezuela 1981 (42.8) 1987 (45.2) 1995 (46.8) b 
Total 18 33 33 
Gini coefficients are in parentheses.  
a: Gini coefficients for 1980 and those not otherwise marked are taken from Deininger-Squire dataset (1996). Income 
concept mostly gross income per person. 
b: Gini coefficient from updated Deininger-Squire (1998). Income concept mostly gross income per person. 
c: Gini coefficient from Milanovic (1998). Income concept for the year 1988 is mostly gross per capita income, for 
1995 disposable income per capita. 
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Table 2: Welfare measures 1980 
 
Rank GNP/cap
a 
(exchange rate) 
GNP/capb 
(PPP) 
GNP/capc 
(PPP) 
Atkinson 
(ε=1)d Sen
e Atkinson (ε=2) f Dagumg 
18 170 CHN 1339 CHN 816 CHN 87.3% CHN 68.0% CHN 75.8% CHN 51.5% CHN 
17 481 IDN 1643 IDN 1542 IDN 84.0% IDN 64.4% IDN 71.4% IDN 47.5% IDN 
16 1115 THA 2575 PHL 2666 THA 71.8% THA 56.9% THA 52.4% THA 39.8% THA 
15 1164 PHL 2937 JAM 3047 JAM 75.8% JAM 56.8% JAM 59.0% JAM 39.7% JAM 
14 1308 BGR 2978 THA 3790 PHL 66.6% MYS 49.0% MYS 46.2% MYS 32.5% MYS 
13 1347 JAM 3812 PER 4099 MYS 73.0% PHL 53.9% PHL 56.1% PHL 36.9% PHL 
12 1606 COL 4011 COL 4117 BGR 67.8% PER 50.7% PER 40.7% COL 29.4% COL 
11 2283 MYS 4512 PAN 4752 PER 62.2% COL 45.5% COL 36.8% BRA 33.9% PER 
10 2357 CRI 4834 CRI 5368 COL 58.0% BRA 42.2% BRA 52.4% PER 26.8% BRA 
9 2497 PAN 5029 MYS 5658 POL 92.0% BGR 75.0% BGR 44.9% CRI 35.6% PAN 
8 2578 PER 5299 BGR 5967 PAN 67.8% CRI 52.5% PAN 50.0% PAN 35.6% CRI 
7 2909 POL 5642 BRA 6057 CRI 69.7% PAN 52.5% CRI 84.5% BGR 60.0% BGR 
6 3171 MEX 5834 POL 6456 BRA 91.4% POL 49.4% MEX 47.9% MEX 32.8% MEX 
5 4041 VEN 6419 HUN 6601 HUN 67.2% MEX 75.1% POL 83.6% POL 60.2% POL 
4 4126 HUN 6675 PRT 8070 MEX 93.9% HUN 79.0% HUN 63.6% PRT 40.0% VEN 
3 4423 BRA 8054 MEX 9158 PRT 80.4% PRT 63.2% PRT 88.4% HUN 46.2% PRT 
2 6996 PRT 10054 ESP 10374 VEN 75.2% VEN 57.2% VEN 57.3% VEN 65.3% HUN 
1 10427 ESP 10166 VEN 11462 ESP 89.4% ESP 73.2% ESP 79.2% ESP 57.7% ESP 
Country codes are explained in Appendix 1. 
a): Data taken from World Bank (1999), measuring GNP/cap, constant 1995 US-Dollars. 
b): Data taken from NBER (2000), measuring GNP/cap in constant 1995 international prices (chain index). 
c): Data taken from World Bank (1999), measuring GNP/cap, PPP adjusted, constant 1995 US-Dollars. 
d): Atkinson measure (ε=1) computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 3). 
e): Sen measure computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 3). 
f): Atkinson measure (ε=2) computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 3). 
g): Dagum measure computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 3). 
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Table 3: Welfare measures 1988 
 
Rank GNP/cap
a 
(exchange rate) 
GNP/capb 
(PPP) Atkinson (ε=1)
c Send Atkinson (ε=2) e Dagumf 
33 333 CHN 1617 CHN 83.0% CHN 65.1% CHN 68.2% CHN 48.3% CHN 
32 646 IDN 2115 IDN 85.5% IDN 68.0% IDN 74.3% IDN 51.5% IDN 
31 1016 PHL 3110 JAM 75.8% JAM 56.8% JAM 30.8% PAN 39.7% JAM 
30 1328 UZB 3322 MDAg 72.9% PHL 54.3% PHL 59.0% JAM 37.2% PHL 
29 1345 JAM 3372 PHL 68.8% THA 52.6% THA 56.0% PHL 35.7% THA 
28 1411 KGZ 3546 UZB 91.8% MDA 57.2% PER 49.3% THA 27.8% PAN 
27 1596 MDAg 3981 KGZ 89.2% UZB 43.5% PAN 35.3% BRA 40.1% PER 
26 1635 THA 3981 THA 56.1% PAN 75.9% MDA 51.8% MYS 34.8% MYS 
25 1702 COL 4230 PER 76.9% PER 51.7% MYS 61.9% PER 28.1% BRA 
24 1784 ROM 4902 MYS 70.1% MYS 71.8% UZB 46.0% COL 32.3% COL 
23 1860 BGR 4927 TKM 90.9% KGZ 48.8% COL 84.4% MDA 56.0% UZB 
22 2110 CRI 5362 UKR 57.0% BRA 43.8% BRA 79.8% UZB 61.2% MDA 
21 2121 TKM 5549 CRI 66.4% COL 74.0% KGZ 54.8% CRI 29.0% MEX 
20 2226 KAZ 5723 PAN 74.3% CRI 58.0% CRI 40.9% MEX 40.8% CRI 
19 2247 PER 5761 ROM 90.7% TKM 45.0% MEX 83.4% KGZ 58.7% KGZ 
18 2348 PAN 5810 COL 61.9% MEX 73.6% TKM 83.0% TKM 58.2% TKM 
17 2575 BLR 5985 BGR 92.5% UKR 76.7% UKR 85.5% UKR 62.2% UKR 
16 2671 MYS 6022 POL 92.3% ROM 76.7% ROM 85.0% ROM 37.8% VEN 
15 2873 LTU 6246 LTU 91.0% POL 74.4% POL 83.0% POL 59.2% POL 
14 2904 MEX 6420 BLR 92.6% BGR 76.7% BGR 54.6% VEN 62.2% ROM 
13 3035 POL 6507 KAZ 93.0% LTU 74.3% KAZ 86.1% BGR 62.2% BGR 
12 3388 UKR 6569 BRA 90.7% KAZ 77.5% LTU 82.3% KAZ 59.1% KAZ 
11 3563 VEN 6756 LVA 92.8% BLR 77.2% BLR 86.6% LTU 63.3% LTU 
10 3882 SVK 6855 EST 92.9% LVA 54.8% VEN 86.1% BLR 62.9% BLR 
9 3895 RUSg 7552 MEX 92.3% EST 77.5% LVA 86.2% LVA 63.3% LVA 
8 4410 BRA 7739 RUSg 73.0% VEN 77.0% EST 85.1% EST 62.6% EST 
7 4526 LVA 7813 HUN 92.0% RUS 76.2% RUS 84.5% RUS 61.6% RUS 
6 4694 EST 8871 SVK 94.0% HUN 79.0% HUN 88.6% HUN 65.3% HUN 
5 4773 HUN 9344 VEN 94.7% SVK 80.5% SVK 64.2% PRT 46.2% PRT 
4 5482 CZE 11148 SVNg 80.6% PRT 63.2% PRT 89.8% SVK 67.4% SVK 
3 8272 SVNg 11459 PRT 92.4% SVN 78.5% SVN 85.6% SVN 64.6% SVN 
2 8580 PRT 11795 CZE 94.7% CZE 80.6% CZE 89.8% CZE 67.5% CZE 
1 12327 ESP 13848 ESP 91.5% ESP 75.6% ESP 83.4% ESP 60.7% ESP 
a): Data taken from World Bank (1999), measuring GNP/cap, constant 1995 US-Dollars. 
b): Data taken from World Bank (1999), measuring GNP/cap, PPP adjusted, constant 1995 US-Dollars. 
c): Atkinson measure (ε=1) computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 2). 
d): Sen measure computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 2). 
e): Atkinson measure (ε=2) computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 2). 
f): Dagum measure computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 2). 
g): Income data of Moldova (MDA) from 1986, Russia (RUS) from 1990, and Slovenia (SVN) from 1992. 
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Table 4: Welfare measures 1995 
 
Rank GNP/cap
a 
(exchange rate) 
GNP/capb 
(PPP) Atkinson (ε=1)
c Send Atkinson (ε=2)e Dagumf 
33 572 CHN 1570 MDA 62.4% KGZ 44.7% KGZ 38.5% KGZ 28.8% KGZ 
32 700 MDA 1930 KGZ 81.5% MDA 63.5% MDA 66.7% MDA 46.5% MDA 
31 727 KGZ 2080 TKM 69.8% UKR 52.6% UKR 51.4% UKR 35.7% UKR 
30 954 TKM 2430 UKR 82.4% TKM 64.2% TKM 68.4% TKM 47.3% TKM 
29 979 UZB 2450 UZB 84.6% UZB 62.2% CHN 64.8% CHN 45.1% CHN 
28 992 IDN 2620 CHN 80.7% CHN 66.7% UZB 71.9% UZB 50.0% UZB 
27 1085 PHL 3050 IDN 75.4% PHL 56.2% PHL 30.4% PAN 39.1% PHL 
26 1229 KAZ 3360 JAM 84.9% IDN 65.8% IDN 59.7% PHL 49.1% IDN 
25 1438 ROM 3370 KAZ 81.2% JAM 62.1% JAM 33.2% BRA 45.0% JAM 
24 1509 BGR 3380 PHL 85.3% KAZ 67.3% KAZ 73.9% IDN 25.0% BRA 
23 1550 JAM 3490 LVA 87.0% LVA 52.0% RUS 67.5% JAM 35.1% RUS 
22 1639 UKR 3770 LTU 81.0% LTU 55.1% PER 55.4% PER 38.1% PER 
21 1778 BLR 4160 BLR 73.5% PER 62.7% LTU 54.2% RUS 50.7% KAZ 
20 1850 LTU 4280 PER 71.6% RUS 69.0% LVA 73.0% KAZ 45.7% LTU 
19 2021 COL 4360 ROM 54.8% BRA 40.0% BRA 66.0% LTU 27.2% COL 
18 2304 RUS 4390 RUS 82.2% EST 42.8% COL 39.5% COL 27.5% PAN 
17 2428 PER 4430 EST 55.7% PAN 43.2% PAN 76.1% LVA 52.7% LVA 
16 2494 LVA 4560 BGR 88.9% BLR 64.6% EST 44.7% THA 32.0% THA 
15 2613 CRI 5700 POL 84.1% BGR 71.6% BLR 67.1% EST 47.7% EST 
14 2771 THA 6080 BRA 88.7% ROM 65.7% BGR 49.7% CRI 48.9% BGR 
13 2875 PAN 6340 THA 60.1% COL 48.5% THA 71.1% BGR 55.8% BLR 
12 2994 MEX 6430 HUN 64.4% THA 71.4% ROM 79.2% BLR 36.1% CRI 
11 3058 POL 6440 CRI 70.1% CRI 53.0% CRI 79.0% ROM 34.7% MYS 
10 3230 EST 6480 COL 69.8% MYS 51.5% MYS 48.3% MEX 33.1% MEX 
9 3261 SVK 6580 PAN 67.6% MEX 49.7% MEX 51.1% MYS 55.5% ROM 
8 3452 VEN 6940 MYS 88.6% POL 71.6% POL 51.6% VEN 36.2% VEN 
7 4032 MYS 6990 SVK 93.0% HUN 53.2% VEN 78.5% POL 55.8% POL 
6 4191 HUN 7300 MEX 71.0% VEN 77.4% HUN 86.5% HUN 63.1% HUN 
5 4349 BRA 8490 VEN 95.4% SVK 81.7% SVK 91.2% SVK 69.1% SVK 
4 4916 CZE 9920 CZE 90.7% CZE 73.4% CZE 83.3% CZE 58.0% CZE 
3 9526 SVN 11060 SVN 91.4% SVN 74.9% SVN 67.5% PRT 47.5% PRT 
2 10450 PRT 13100 PRT 82.7% PRT 64.4% PRT 84.0% SVN 59.9% SVN 
1 14145 ESP 14910 ESP 85.6% ESP 67.5% ESP 73.5% ESP 51.0% ESP 
a): Data taken from World Bank (1999), measuring GNP/cap, constant 1995 US-Dollars. 
b): Data taken from World Bank (1999), measuring GNP/cap, PPP adjusted, constant 1995 US-Dollars. 
c): Atkinson measure (ε=1) computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 2). 
d): Sen measure computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 2). 
e): Atkinson measure (ε=2) computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 2). 
f): Dagum measure computed on the basis of, and expressed as a share of GNP/cap, PPP adjusted (column 2). 
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Table 5: The nature of Inequality in Transition and Non-Transition countries 1988, 1995 
 
1988 1995 
Country Gini 
coefficient 
Income share 
of poorest 
quintile 
Atkinson (ε=2) 
- Dagum 
Gini 
coefficient 
Income share 
of poorest 
quintile 
Atkinson (ε=2) 
- Dagum 
Bulgaria 23.3 10.63% 23.9% 34.3 7.11% 22.2% 
Belarus 22.8 10.48% 23.3% 28.4 8.70% 23.4% 
Brazil 56.2 2.70% 7.2% 60.1 2.48% 8.3% 
China 34.9 6.60% 20.0% 37.8 6.02% 19.7% 
Colombia 51.2 3.70% 13.7% 57.2 3.10% 12.3% 
Costa Rica 42.0 4.40% 13.9% 47.0 3.99% 13.6% 
Czech Republic 19.4 11.92% 22.3% 26.6 10.50% 25.3% 
Spain 24.4 9.49% 22.7% 32.5 7.54% 22.6% 
Estonia 23.0 9.99% 22.5% 35.4 6.13% 19.4% 
Hungary 21.0 11.42% 23.3% 22.6 10.62% 23.4% 
Indonesia 32.0 7.99% 22.8% 34.2 8.37% 24.9% 
Jamaica 43.2 5.41% 19.3% 37.9 6.82% 22.4% 
Kazakhstan 25.7 9.47% 23.2% 32.7 7.49% 22.3% 
Kyrgyz Republic 26.0 10.57% 24.7% 55.3 2.69% 9.7% 
Lithuania 22.5 10.64% 23.3% 37.3 6.21% 20.4% 
Latvia 22.5 10.44% 22.9% 31.0 8.04% 23.4% 
Moldova 24.1 9.96% 23.2% 36.5 6.38% 20.2% 
Mexico 55.0 3.20% 11.8% 50.3 4.13% 15.2% 
Malaysia 48.4 4.58% 16.9% 48.5 4.45% 16.4% 
Panama 56.5 2.00% 3.0% 56.8 1.97% 2.9% 
Peru 42.8 6.20% 21.8% 44.9 4.88% 17.4% 
Philippines 45.7 5.20% 18.7% 43.8 5.85% 20.6% 
Poland 25.6 9.71% 23.8% 28.4 8.37% 22.7% 
Portugal 36.8 5.70% 17.9% 35.6 6.14% 20.0% 
Romania 23.3 9.97% 22.8% 28.6 8.74% 23.5% 
Russia 23.8 9.91% 22.9% 48.0 4.86% 19.1% 
Slovakia 19.5 11.89% 22.4% 18.3 12.55% 22.2% 
Slovenia 21.5 10.49% 21.0% 25.1 10.10% 24.1% 
Thailand 47.4 4.10% 13.6% 51.5 3.70% 12.7% 
Turkmenistan 26.4 10.50% 24.8% 35.8 6.70% 21.2% 
Ukraine 23.3 10.31% 23.3% 47.4 4.27% 15.7% 
Uzbekistan 28.2 8.97% 23.8% 33.3 7.28% 21.9% 
Venezuela 45.2 4.73% 16.8% 46.8 4.33% 15.4% 
Note: Columns three and six indicate the absolute difference in percentage points pf PPP per capita income between 
the Atkinson (ε=2) and the Dagum measure expressed in percentages (column 5 minus column 6 in Table 3 and Table 
4, respectively). 
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Table 6: The Determinants of the Gini Coefficients 
 
 (1) (2) 
Expenditure -5.03 (-12.7) -4.75 (-12.2) 
Net Income -2.99 (-11.9) 0.38 (0.9) 
Unknown Income 0.30 (1.0) 0.53 (1.7) 
Household 1.38 (6.2) 1.55 (7.1) 
Unit Unknown 1.50 (1.9) 1.41 (1.8) 
Family 0.65 (1.3) 0.51 (1.1) 
Equivalized -2.01 (-6.4) -1.63 (-5.3) 
Primary Source not known 0.29 (0.7) 0.19 (0.5) 
No consistent source -0.87 (-4.1) -0.96 (-4.6) 
OECD * Net Income  -4.80 (-10.3) 
Constant 36.52 (164.6) 36.45 (167.4) 
N 2855 2855 
R-Squared 0.17 0.20 
Note: Regressions include ‘accept’ and ‘ps’ and ‘cs’ coded data from Deininger and Squire (1996) and from Wider (1999).  The 
regression is a fixed-effects regression, with t-statistics in parentheses.   
 
 
Table 7: Change in Rankings due to Adjusted Gini Coefficients 
 
 No change 1 Rank 2 Ranks 3 Ranks 4+ Ranks 
Sen Measure      
1980 16 2 0 0 0 
1988 31 2 0 0 0 
1995 25 6 2 0 0 
Dagum Measure      
1980 12 6 0 0 0 
1988 29 4 0 0 0 
1995 21 8 3 0 1 
Note: Mexico is the country, that looses 4 ranks in the Dagum measure in 1995. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
original Gini coefficient was based on expenditures per capita and has been adjusted to disposable income per capita 
by adding nearly 5 percentage points. 
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Table 8: Change of social Well-being Indicators in Transition Countries 
 
Life expectancy  
in years 
Mortality 
ratea  
School 
enrolmentb  
Transition 
indexc 
Freedom House 
Indexd 
1988 1998 Country 
Female Male Female Male 
1989 1998 1989 1993 1994 1997 1988-89 1999-00 
Bulgaria 75e 68e 75 67 18 15 77 70 2.5 2.8 7, 7 NF 2, 3 F 
Belarus 76 67 74 63 15 14 98 91 1.7 1.4 6, 5 NFh 6, 6 NF 
Czech Republic 75 68 78 71 12 6 93 92 3.5 3.5 7, 6 NFi 1, 2 F 
Estonia 75 67 75 64 19 12 126 94 3.3 3.4 6, 5 NFh 1, 2 F 
Hungary 74 66 75 66 18 12 75 94 3.3 3.7 5, 4 PF 1, 2 F 
Kazakhstan 73 65 70 59 - 29 101 92 1.7 2.7 6, 5 NFh 6, 5 NF 
Kyrgyz Republic 70e 62e 71 63 47 41 102 90 2.8 2.8 6, 5 NFh 5, 5 PF 
Lithuania 77 68 77 67 14 12 95 81 3.0 3.1 6, 5 NFh 1, 2 F 
Latvia 75 66 76 64 15 19 97 87 2.8 3.2 6, 5 NFh 1, 2 F 
Moldova 71 64 70 63 - 22 83 84 2.2 2.6 6, 5 NFh 2, 4 PF 
Poland 76 67 77 69 22 11 82 94 3.3 3.4 5, 5 PF 1, 2 F 
Romania 72 67 73 66 35 25 101 79 2.7 2.7 7, 7 NF 2, 2 F 
Russia 74 65 73 61 22 20 95 87 2.7 3.0 6, 5 NFh 4, 5 PF 
Slovakia 76 67 77 69 16 10 - 89 3.3 3.3 7, 6 NFi 1, 2 F 
Slovenia 76e 68e 79 71 10 7 90 90 3.2 3.2 2, 3 Fg 1, 2 F 
Turkmenistan 69 62 70 63 - 44 - - 1.2 1.5 6, 5 NFh 7, 7 NF 
Ukraine 75 66 73 62 - 17 95 91 1.3 2.4 6, 5 NFh 3, 4 PF 
Uzbekistan 71 66 73 66 - 29 101 94 2.0 2.0 6, 5 NFh 7, 6 NF 
World 67e 63e 69 65 - 75 54 62 - - - - 
Latin-America & 
Caribbean 70
e 64e 73 67 - 38 48 49 - - - - 
High Income 79e 72e 81 75 - 6 94 105 - - - - 
Middle Income 70e 65e 72 67 51f 38 55 60 - - - - 
a: Measures the under five mortality rate per 1000 live births in percent. 
b: Measures gross secondary enrolment rate in percent. 
c: Composite index considering various dimensions of transition, including price liberalization, privatization, restructuring, competition policy, 
and reform of financial institutions. 
d: The characters representing scores are, from left to right, political rights, civil liberties, and freedom status. Each of the first two is measured on 
a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. 'F', 'PF', and 'NF' respectively stand for 'free', 
'partly free', and 'not free'. 
e: 1987 
f: 1990 
g: 1991-92 
h: This rating is for Soviet Union. 
i: This rating is for Czechoslovakia. 
 All data are taken from World Bank 1999, except for life expectancy data and mortality rates of 1998. Those are from World Bank 2000. Data on 
Transition Index and Freedom House Index are available on http://www.ebrd.org and http://www.freedomhouse.org, respectively. 
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Figure 1: 
Real Income Ratio 1998 to 1988
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Source: World Bank (1999, 2000)
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Figure 2: 
Rankings: Poland versus Brazil
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Rankings: Ukraine versus Indonesia
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Rankings: Kyrgyz Republic versus Panama
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Rankings: Romania versus Thailand
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Figure 3: 
 
Growth of Real Income  per decile 1988-1995
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Figure 4: 
 
Well-Being Losses in Transition Countries
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Note: There are slightly different time periods used, depending on data availability in Milanovic (1998). See 
also Table 1. 
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Figure 5: 
 
Income Loss and Inequality Change, 1988-1995
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Appendix I: Country Acronyms 
 
BGR Bulgaria 
BLR Belarus 
BRA Brazil 
CHN China 
COL Colombia 
CRI Costa Rica 
CZE Czech Republic 
ESP Spain 
EST Estonia 
HUN Hungary 
JAM Jamaica 
KAZ Kazakhstan 
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic 
LTU Lithuania 
MDA Moldova 
MEX Mexico 
MYS Malaysia 
PAN Panama 
PER Peru 
PHL Philippines 
POL Poland 
PRT Portugal 
ROM Romania 
RUS Russian Federation 
SVK Slovak Republic 
SVN Slovenia 
THA Thailand 
TKM Turkmenistan 
UKR Ukraine 
UZB Uzbekistan 
VEN Venezuela 
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Appendix  2: Comparing Gini Coefficients from different Data Sources  
 
Country Pre-Transition Perioda Post-Transition Periodb 
Bulgaria 1989 (23.3) - - 1993 (34.3) - - 
Belarus 1988 (22.8) 1989 (23.8) 1989 (23) 1995 (28.4) 1995 (30) - 
Czech Republic 1988 (19.4) - 1989 (20) 1993 (26.6) - 1996 (25.8)c 
Estonia 1988 (23.0) 1989 (29.9) 1989 (28) 1995 (35.4) 1995 (31) - 
Hungary 1987 (21.0) 1987 (24.4) - 1993 (22.6) 1993 (27) 1995 (24.2) 
Kazakhstan 1988 (25.7) 1989 (28.9) - 1993 (32.7) - - 
Kyrgyz Republic 1988 (26.0) 1989 (28.7) 1989 (27) 1993 (55.3) 1993 (43) - 
Lithuania 1988 (22.5) 1989 (27.8) 1989 (26) 1994 (37.3) - - 
Latvia 1988 (22.5) 1989 (27.4) 1989 (26) 1995 (31.0) - - 
Moldova 1988 (24.1) 1989 (25.8) 1989 (25) 1993 (36.5) - - 
Poland 1987 (25.6) 1989 (26.8) - 1993 (28.4) 1993 (31) 1995 (32.1) 
Romania 1989 (23.3) - - 1994 (28.6) 1994 (33) - 
Russia 1988 (23.8) 1989 (27.8) 1989 (27) 1993 (48.0) 1993 (50) 1995 (38.1)c 
Slovakia 1988 (19.5) - - 1993 (18.3) - - 
Slovenia 1987 (21.5) - - 1993 (25.1) - - 
Turkmenistan 1988 (26.4) 1989 (30.7) 1989 (28) 1993 (35.8) - - 
Ukraine 1988 (23.3) 1989 (23.5) 1989 (23) 1995 (47.4) 1995 (44) - 
Uzbekistan 1989 (28.2) 1989 (30.4) 1989 (28) 1993 (33.3) - - 
Gini coefficients are in parentheses. 
a: Gini coefficients in column one are from Milanovic (1998) (mostly gross per capita income), column two from Atkinson, 
Micklewright (1992) (individual distribution of household per capita income), column three from Flemming, Micklewright (2000) 
(individual distribution of per capita household income). Flemming and Micklewright (2000) use the data from Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1992), but apply a slightly different procedure for calculating the Ginis. 
b: Gini coefficients in column one and two are from Milanovic (1998) (disposable income and expenditures per capita, respectively), 
column three from Flemming, Micklewright (2000) (distribution of individuals per capita income). 
c: There are other data sources available as well. In the case of the Czech Republic, Flemming and Micklewright provide data from the 
microcensus and the budget survey, respectively. Microcensus data are shown here. These Gini coefficients are higher for the period 
covered (1988-1997) in Flemming, Micklewright (2000). Ginis derived from the budget survey are not continuously available, but jump 
in 1993. In the case of Russia, the Gini computed from the Family Budget Survey is shown here, but data from the Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey are also presented in Flemming, Micklewright (2000). Milanovic also use this data source, and according to that 
survey, Gini coefficients in Russia are significantly higher. 
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